Section 2

SOCRATES: instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.

EUTHYPHRO: clear indeed to you.

SOCRATES: apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking; I said to myself: 'Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.' And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.

EUTHYPHRO: holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.

SOCRATES: to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say?

EUTHYPHRO: the test of enquiry.

SOCRATES: point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference lies?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES:

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES:

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: suffering?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: according to your definition, loved by all the gods?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES:

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES:

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two different things.

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one another. For one (theophiles) is of a kind to be loved cause it is loved, and the other (osion) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence—the attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel); and what is impiety?

EUTHYPHRO: For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away from us.

SOCRATES: Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are placed because I am a descendant of his. But now, since these notions are your own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move.

EUTHYPHRO: sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them move or go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.

SOCRATES: made his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well. And the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are lazy, I will myself endeavour to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labour. Tell me, then—Is not that which is pious necessarily just?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings—

'Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things, You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also reverence.'

Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid of an ill reputation.

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is also fear. But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd. I suppose that you follow me now?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just; and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases; for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not agree?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.

EUTHYPHRO: justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice which attends to men.

SOCRATES: which I should like to have further information, What is the meaning of 'attention'? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For instance, horses are said to require attention, and not every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: attending to horses?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: huntsman?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: art of attending to dogs?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES:

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: gods?—that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved, are they not?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended for their good and not for their hurt?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES:

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you did not.

EUTHYPHRO: which I mean.

SOCRATES: which is called piety?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES:

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: view the attainment of some object—would you not say of health?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: a view to the attainment of some result?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: view to the building of a house?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best instructed in religion.

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: do by the help of our ministrations?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: chief or principal one?

EUTHYPHRO: things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or holiness is learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. Such piety is the salvation of families and states, just as the impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction.

SOCRATES: chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me—clearly not: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered me I should have truly learned of you by this time the nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: the gods?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES:

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: science, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES:

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: they want of us. There would be no meaning in an art which gives to any one that which he does not want.

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: doing business with one another?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: wish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; for there is no good thing which they do not give; but how we can give any good thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have very greatly the advantage of them.

EUTHYPHRO: gods from our gifts?

SOCRATES: conferred by us upon the gods?

EUTHYPHRO: saying, what pleases them?

SOCRATES: to them?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: the gods?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for the argument, as you will perceive, comes round to the same point. Were we not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? Have you forgotten?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: and is not this the same as what is dear to them—do you see?

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: were right then, we are wrong now.

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on behalf of a serf, have charged your aged father with murder. You would not have run such a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too much respect for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore, that you know the nature of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not hide your knowledge.

EUTHYPHRO:

SOCRATES: hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety; and then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had given up rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life.